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Moore v. British Columbia: A Good 
IDEA? 
Robert E. Charney and Sarah Kraicer∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Moore v. British Columbia (Education),1 the Supreme Court of 
Canada was faced with the question of whether the special education 
program provided by a British Columbia District School Board to Jeffrey 
Moore, a student with severe learning disabilities (“SLD”), infringed the 
British Columbia Human Rights Code,2 and, if it did, what the appropri-
ate remedy was under the Code. At first instance the Human Rights 
Tribunal3 found both individual and systemic discrimination. It con-
cluded that the District School Board had failed to provide Jeffrey and 
other SLD students with the level of support needed, and that the Minis-
try of Education provided inadequate funding for SLD students and 
failed to appropriately monitor the delivery of special education services 
provided by the school district. The Tribunal ordered damages and sys-
temic remedies against both the District School Board and the Ministry 
of Education. The damages award included reimbursement of the costs of 
tuition and partial transportation paid for Jeffrey to attend private schools 
                                                                                                             
∗ General Counsel and Counsel respectively, Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the 
Attorney General of Ontario. The authors were counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario, which 
intervened in the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. British Columbia (Education), [2012] S.C.J. 
No. 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.). The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors, 
and do not represent the position of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario. The authors are 
grateful to Janet Pounder for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Padraic 
Ryan and Sarah Morton for their research assistance. 
1 [2012] S.C.J. No. 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moore SCC”]. 
2 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210. 
3 Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 580, 54 
C.H.R.R. D/245 [hereinafter “Moore BCHRT”]. 
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up to and including the end of Grade 12. The systemic remedies required 
the Ministry to rewrite the funding methodology for special education, 
and to centralize oversight of individual special education programs 
within the Ministry of Education.  
The Tribunal’s decision was reversed by the British Columbia 
courts,4 which found that there had been no discrimination against Jef-
frey because he had been provided with the same or better special 
education program as any other SLD student in the province. 
The Supreme Court of Canada “substantially allowed”5 the appeal, 
reinstating the Tribunal’s damages award against the District School 
Board, but rejecting both the damages award and the systemic remedies 
that had been ordered against the Ministry of Education.  
In considering the Supreme Court decision in Moore, we will divide 
our analysis into three parts. The first will be a general consideration of 
private school vouchers in Canada and the United States, because we are 
of the view that this consideration is relevant to both the substantive and 
remedial issues confronting courts in cases involving accommodation in 
the public school system. The second part is consideration of the substan-
tive question of whether Jeffrey had been discriminated against by the 
District School Board or the Ministry. The third is whether, assuming 
that the District School Board had failed to accommodate Jeffrey, the 
damages order upheld by the Supreme Court was appropriate in the cir-
cumstances. While we are in general agreement with the Supreme 
Court’s mode of analysis of the substantive question, and agree with its 
dismissal of the systemic remedies against the Ministry, we take issue 
with the damages award made against the District School Board. 
II. PRIVATE SCHOOL VOUCHERS 
Public funding of private schools has been a hotly contested political 
issue across Canada. Parents who are dissatisfied with the public school 
system promote the public funding of private schools on the basis of pa-
rental choice, religious or cultural diversity, and/or the premise that 
greater competition will lead to better schools. Different provinces have 
                                                                                                             
4 British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore, [2008] B.C.J. No. 348, 81 B.C.L.R. 
(4th) 107 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Moore SC”]; and British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. 
Moore, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2097, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 246 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Moore CA”]. 
5 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 71. 
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responded to these arguments with different education policies. Some, 
like Ontario, limit public funding to the public school system;6 others, 
like British Columbia and Quebec, provide limited funding to private 
schools and impose strict limits and eligibility criteria on this funding.7 
No province in Canada funds private schools on an equal basis with pub-
lic schools, and no province in Canada has followed the example of some 
American states of offering parents a “voucher” to cover the cost of pri-
vate school tuition. Certainly no province in Canada has decided to 
provide more funding to private schools than to public schools. 
In Canada, the political consensus remains that public dollars should 
primarily, or exclusively, focus on building a public school system that is 
open and accessible to all students in the community. The importance of 
this government objective has been recognized by the courts, which have 
rejected Charter8-based claims to funding for private schools based on 
religion, ethnicity and language.9 While parents have the right to send 
their children to private schools, there is no constitutional right to public 
funding of private schools. The decision whether to fund private schools, 
or to offer tuition vouchers to parents who opt out of the public school 
system, is a policy choice for government to make. 
Americans have taken a somewhat different approach to private school 
funding, and, based on a combination of philosophical and historical 
factors, have been more receptive to public funding of private schools. 
Some of this sympathy for private school funding is likely a result of the 
American distrust of government monopolies and a preference for a 
private enterprise model. The same laissez-faire political philosophy that 
                                                                                                             
6 This policy is complicated in Ontario by s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 
Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), which guarantees public funding to Roman Catholic Separate Schools, which 
are thereby part of the public school system in Ontario (Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the 
Education Act (Ontario), [1987] S.C.J. No. 44, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (S.C.C.)). Like public 
schools, the separate schools are governed by elected school boards under the Education Act, 
R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2 [hereinafter “Ontario Education Act”], Part IV. Throughout this paper the 
term “public school system” is meant to refer to schools governed or managed by an elected 
school board. 
7 British Columbia: Independent Schools Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 216 and Independent 
School Regulation, B.C. Reg. 262/89, as am. B.C. Reg. 90/2011, at ss. 3-4; Quebec: An Act 
Respecting Private Education, R.S.Q. c. E-9.1, Chapter V (Subsidies), Div. I- IV. 
8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
9 See, e.g., Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.); Bal 
v. Ontario, [1997] O.J. No. 2597, 34 O.R. (3d) 484 (Ont. C.A.); Cooper v. Ontario (Attorney 
General), [2009] O.J. No. 3589, 311 D.L.R. (4th) 480 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 
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made the Obama administration’s proposal for public health insurance so 
controversial in the United States influences their view of the delivery of 
education.10 Certain efforts to provide state funding to private schools can 
be traced to America’s troubled history of racial segregation. As the United 
States courts ordered the desegregation of the public school system, 
recalcitrant state legislatures tried to circumvent the court rulings by 
offering parents private school vouchers so they could opt out of the 
desegregated public school system.11 Other states offered private school 
vouchers in an effort to provide financial support to religious schools and 
thereby circumvent the establishment of religion clause in the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from 
establishing programs that have the “primary effect” of advancing 
religion.12 
Funding private schools is one approach that the United States has 
taken to provide special education programs for students whose mental 
or physical disabilities require special accommodation. The federal Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)13 establishes the 
standards that school districts must meet in order to receive federal fund-
ing for the education of students with disabilities. IDEA provides that 
students with disabilities are entitled to a “free and appropriate public 
education” (“FAPE”) set out in an individualized education plan (“IEP”) 
developed with parental input to meet the child’s special education 
needs. School districts can meet their obligations under IDEA by provid-
ing a FAPE at a public school or by referring a student to a private 
                                                                                                             
10 Consistent with this, Sarah Palin, the Republican Vice-Presidential nominee for 2008, 
advocated changing the federal regulations to enable federal education funding to be “fully portable 
to any public or private school elected by the parents”. In contrast, Barack Obama went on record in 
opposition to “using public money for private school[s]” during his campaign. Wendy F. Hensel, 
“Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The Future of Special Education?” (2010) 39 J.L. & Educ. 
291, at 310 [hereinafter “Hensel”].  
11 See Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), in 
which the Supreme Court found that closing public schools and providing grants of public funds for 
children to attend private schools was an unconstitutional scheme to avoid desegregation. 
12 Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S. Ct. 
2995 (1973), invalidating a New York program that was found “unmistakably to provide desired 
financial support for non-public, sectarian institutions”, at 773-74. Such vouchers are permissible, 
however, where the program is neutral with respect to religion and provides assistance to religious 
institutions “only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients”: Zelman 
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).  
13 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq. (this statute was previously entitled the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (1975)). 
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special education program at public expense.14 In addition, the United 
States Supreme Court has interpreted the court’s broad remedial authority 
under IDEA as authorizing courts to order reimbursement of private 
school tuition and expenses in cases where the parents unilaterally with-
drew their child from the public school because the school’s special 
education services did not meet the child’s needs. The Supreme Court 
held that “when a public school fails to provide a FAPE and a child’s 
parents place the child in an appropriate private school without the 
school district’s consent, a court may require the district to reimburse the 
parents for the cost of the private education”.15 This authority to order 
reimbursement of private school tuition may be applied even in cases 
where the child has never attended a public school.16 
In addition to the federally mandated IDEA, three states provide uni-
versal vouchers for all students with disabilities, and a number of other 
states have proposed similar legislation.17  
There are obvious public policy implications to requiring public 
school boards to cover the cost of private school for students with dis-
abilities, and the impact of these vouchers on the public system in the 
United States remains controversial.18 The most significant impact is fi-
nancial: public school funds, whether generated from grants or local 
property taxes, are spent by public school boards for the benefit of all 
students in the public system. As the number of children attending pri-
vate school at public expense increases, the funds available to educate 
students with disabilities in public schools decreases.19 Capital improve-
ments like ramps and elevators, and equipment such as specialized 
software, lifting devices and hearing support equipment, are not the 
property of individual students, but remain part of the board’s investment 
for future students with similar disability-related needs. Professional 
staff, including special education teachers and teaching assistants, even 
                                                                                                             
14 In contrast, Ontario school boards have no authority to spend board funds on private 
school tuition: see Ontario Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 170(1)7 and text at footnote 70 below. 
15 School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 
at 370, 105 S. Ct. 1996 [hereinafter “Burlington”]; Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 557 U.S. 
230 at 232, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009) [hereinafter “Forest Grove”].  
16 Forest Grove, id. 
17 Hensel, supra, note 10. Hensel indicates that Florida, Utah and Georgia provide 
“universal special needs vouchers”, and a fourth state, Ohio, provides a voucher only for children 
with autism and autism spectrum disorder (at 299). 
18 Id., at 294. 
19 Id., at 318. 
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when assigned to individual students, are available as a resource for other 
teachers and students in the class or school. Specialized staff training 
enables public schools to develop institutional expertise for the benefit of 
current and future students. Requiring public funding of private schools 
redirects scarce resources from the public system. It does nothing to en-
hance the capacity of public schools to accommodate the special 
education needs of students with disabilities and may ultimately under-
mine the ability of public school boards to fulfil their public education 
mandate, including the provision of special education services and pro-
grams for students with special education needs.20  
If the public policy goal is to make public schools accessible to 
students with disabilities, then resources must be focused on making 
public schools accessible to students with disabilities, not on providing 
access to private schools. To use a simplistic example, if a public school 
is inaccessible to a disabled student because it does not have a ramp, the 
solution is not to require the public school to pay for that student to 
attend a private school with a ramp; the solution is to order the public 
school to build a ramp.  
As will be seen when we examine the Moore case, however, the issue 
is never as simplistic as the ramp example given above. School boards 
rarely, if ever, simply refuse to provide any accommodation.21 The issue, 
                                                                                                             
20 Similar concerns have been stated by the Florida Supreme Court, which invalidated an 
earlier version of the Florida voucher program as being inconsistent with art. IX, s. 1(a) of the 
Florida state constitution, which guarantees a “uniform system of public free schools” and “the 
liberal maintenance of such system of free schools”. The Court stated: 
It diverts public dollars into separate private systems parallel to and in competition with 
the free public schools that are the sole means set out in the Constitution for the state to 
provide for the education of Florida’s children. This diversion not only reduces money 
available to the free schools, but also funds private schools that are not “uniform” when 
compared with each other or the public system. Many standards imposed by law on the 
public schools are inapplicable to the private schools receiving public monies.  
Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, at 399 (2006). Discussed in Hensel, supra, note 10, at 311-12.  
21 All school boards in Canada are obliged by statute to provide special education programs 
for their students: British Columbia: School Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412, s. 168(2)(a) [hereinafter 
“B.C. School Act”]; Individual Education Plan Order, Ministerial Order M638/95, December 18, 
1995, s. 2(1). Alberta: School Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-3, s. 47(2) (new legislation was enacted in 2012 
and is awaiting proclamation). Saskatchewan: The Education Act, 1995, S.S. 1995, c. E-0.2, 
s. 178(8). Manitoba: The Public Schools Act, C.C.S.M. c. P250, s. 41(1)(a.1). Ontario: Ontario 
Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 170(1)7. Quebec: Education Act, R.S.Q. c. I-13.3, s. 244 [hereinafter 
“Quebec Education Act”]. New Brunswick: Education Act, S.N.B. 1997, c. E-1.12, s. 12. Nova 
Scotia: Education Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c. 1, s. 64(2)(d). Prince Edward Island: School Act, R.S.P.E.I. 
1988, c. S-2.1, s. 7(1)(e). Newfoundland: Schools Act, 1997, S.N.L. 1997, c. S-12.2, s. 75(1)(d). 
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rather, is how to measure the adequacy of the accommodation that the 
school board does provide. Is it measured against the optimum program 
recommended by experts? If this is the standard, it is unlikely that it 
could be met by any public education programs, whether typical or spe-
cial. Or is it whether the special education program offered by the public 
school is “as good as” the program offered by the best private school? 
This is an issue that presents itself to all parents, whether or not their 
children have special education needs, who consider whether to place 
their child in a private school. Or is it an expectation that the accommo-
dation will put the student in the position she would have been in had she 
not had a disability “by comparing the achievement of a disabled student 
to the achievement of his or her nondisabled peers”,22 a standard of ac-
commodation that may not be possible to meet for children with certain 
complex disabilities including some cognitive disabilities? Or is it an 
expectation that the accommodation will provide an equivalent opportu-
nity to access the program offered in public school to non-disabled 
students,23 however that is to be measured? 
Moore arose under the British Columbia Human Rights Code, which 
prohibits discrimination in the provision of services customarily avail-
able to the public. As the challenge was framed as a matter of discrimina-
tion, the standard to measure adequacy of the accommodation had to bear 
some relationship to “equality”. The proper comparison for the equality 
analysis was, in part, where the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with 
the British Columbia courts. Significantly, American jurisprudence has 
expressly rejected “equality” as the appropriate standard to be applied 
under IDEA, stating that this would “present an entirely unworkable 
standard requiring impossible measurement and comparisons”: 
                                                                                                             
Yukon: Education Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 61, s. 15. Northwest Territories: Education Act, S.N.W.T. 
1995, c. 28, s. 7. Nunavut: Education Act, S. Nu. 2008, c. 15, s. 41(1). 
22 Judith Deberry, “Comment: When Parents and Educators Clash: Are Special Education 
Students Entitled to a Cadillac Education?”(2003) 34 St. Mary’s L.J. 503, at 524, 534 [hereinafter 
“Deberry”]. 
23 See Mark C. Weber, “Common-Law Interpretation of Appropriate Education: The Road 
Not Taken in Rowley” (2012) 41 J.L. & Educ. 95, at 110-15. Requiring the provision of an 
education that enables a child with a disability to “achieve his or her full potential” would fail to 
recognize that “even the best public schools rarely have the resources to enable every child to reach 
his or her full potential” (at 115).  
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The educational opportunities provided by our public school systems 
undoubtedly differ from student to student, depending upon a myriad of 
factors that might affect a particular student’s ability to assimilate 
information presented in the classroom. The requirement that States 
provide “equal” educational opportunities would thus seem to present 
an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements 
and comparisons … The theme of the Act is “free appropriate public 
education,” a phrase which is too complex to be captured by the word 
“equal” whether one is speaking of opportunities or services.24 
Instead, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted FAPE as 
requiring only that the program offer “some educational benefit”; as long 
as a disabled child is receiving “some educational benefit” from his or 
her education, the requirement of FAPE will be met.25 While access to 
education must be made meaningful, this does not require a school board 
to maximize the potential of disabled students commensurate with the 
opportunity provided other students, or to provide a specified program 
even if it may offer superior results.26 This limited duty in turn limits the 
potential liability of school boards to pay for private schools under 
IDEA. The question is whether the standard of accommodation estab-
lished by the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore is more demanding 
than the standard under IDEA, potentially making public payment of pri-
vate school tuition more available in Canada than it is in the United 
States.  
III. MOORE V. BRITISH COLUMBIA 
At first blush, Moore v. British Columbia does not appear to be about 
public funding of private schools. In our view, however, the Human 
Rights Tribunal remedy upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, with 
virtually no comment and no examination of its implications, is exactly 
that: a voucher for private school tuition. The remedy ordered in that case 
— reimbursement of nine years of private school tuition (from Grades 4 
to 12) — bears no relation to the perceived inadequacy of the special 
                                                                                                             
24 Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, at 198-99 (1982). 
25 Id., at 201-202. For a general discussion of the Rowley case and its progeny, see T. Daris 
Isbell, “Making Up for Lost Educational Opportunities” (2010-2011) 76 Brook. L.R. 1717, at 1728-49. 
26 Deberry, supra, note 22, at 534-35. 
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education program actually offered by the school board in this case, nor 
did it accomplish its purported goal of providing access to the public 
education system. This remedy has profound implications beyond the 
interests of the individual student and the impact of a single order for 
payment of private school tuition. As a result of the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Moore, private school tuition payment orders have the potential 
to become a widely sought alternative to accommodation within the pub-
lic school system. 
1. Human Rights Tribunal Decision 
The Moore case concerned a student, Jeffrey, with a severe learning 
disability (dyslexia) that prevented him from learning to read and write 
through standard teaching methods. He attended the public school system 
from kindergarten to Grade 3, where, as a result of several assessments, 
various special supports were provided to help him to learn to read and 
write. In Grades 1 and 2 these supports included individual help from a 
teaching aide and attending a Learning Assistance Centre three times a 
week for half-hour individual sessions with a learning assistance teacher 
and a volunteer tutor. He continued to make poor progress in Grades 1 
and 2, and underwent a full psycho-educational assessment in Grade 2. 
Following this assessment the school board psychologist “concluded that 
Jeffrey needed more intensive remediation than he had been receiving 
and suggested that he attend the Diagnostic Centre”.27  
The Diagnostic Centre (“DC1”) was operated by the District School 
Board from 1976 to 1994, and offered intensive remediation to severely 
learning disabled students. It consisted of three teachers and up to 18 
learning disabled students who were enrolled in a segregated program for 
three or four months in one of the DC1 classes. In addition, the DC1 
teachers would work one day per week with classroom and learning 
assistance teachers after the student returned to his or her home school. This 
follow-up continued for two years. The District was the only one in British 
Columbia to offer a segregated program for students with dyslexia.28  
Jeffrey Moore did not attend the DC1 in Grade 3, however, because 
the District School Board closed it that year. Instead he was provided 
                                                                                                             
27 Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 13. 
28 Moore SC, supra, note 4, at para. 21.  
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with approximately five hours per week of individual special education 
supports in his current school consisting of two 30-minute sessions of 
individual instruction in the Learning Assistance Centre, two 40-minute 
periods of individual assistance with a tutor in the Learning Assistance 
Centre, and four 40-minute sessions per week of individual instruction 
from a teacher’s aide in the classroom. After Jeffrey completed Grade 3, 
the Moores withdrew him from the public school and placed him at 
Kenneth Gordon School, a private school specializing in teaching 
students with learning disabilities from Grades 4 to 7. Jeffrey Moore 
never returned to public school, and graduated from Grade 12 at the 
Fraser Academy, another private school specializing in children with 
disabilities.29 
The evidence before the Tribunal was that the District School Board 
closed the DC1 in 1995 for financial reasons. The DC1 cost the Board 
$292,500 per year to operate. The District School Board blamed its 
decision to close the DC1 on “underfunding” by the province. The Board 
did not consider the DC1 model to be financially sustainable, and, given 
the philosophy of integration or inclusion,30 expected that the services 
provided by the DC1 could be provided in the neighbourhood schools 
through individual support from specialized aides in the classroom.31  
The central legal question was whether Jeffrey had been discrimi-
nated against contrary to section 8 of the British Columbia Human Rights 
Code because he had been denied a “service … customarily available to 
the public” on the basis of disability.32  
The Tribunal held that the special education program offered by the 
school board after the closure of the DC1 was not sufficient for Jeffrey’s 
needs, and “concluded that there was both individual and systemic 
discrimination against Jeffrey and systemic discrimination against Severe 
                                                                                                             
29 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 15, 16. 
30 The evidence before the Tribunal did not support segregated facilities for SLD students, 
but indicated that the critical issue was level of support provided regardless of the location. Moore 
SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 14, 68. At the time these facts arose, many parents of children with 
disabilities were advocating for integrated settings as the presumptive placement required by Charter 
s. 15(1). See Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eaton”]. 
31 Moore SC, id., at paras. 68-70. 
32 Section 8 of the British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, states that 
it is discriminatory if a “person … without a bona fide and reasonable justification … den[ies] to a 
person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the 
public” on the basis of a prohibited ground. 
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Learning Disabilities (“SLD”) students in general”.33 It ordered that the 
Moores be reimbursed for the costs related to Jeffrey’s attendance at 
private schools (tuition and half his transportation costs) from Grade 4 
until the end of Grade 12. Both the District School Board and the 
Ministry of Education were held responsible for these damages; the 
District School Board because, inter alia, it did not follow its own staff’s 
recommendation that Jeffrey attend the DC1 and it did not ensure that, 
following the closure of the DC1, other sufficiently intense and effective 
interventions were in place to replace it. While the Tribunal expressed 
sympathy for the Board’s “compelling”34 financial circumstances, it 
nonetheless concluded that the District School Board had failed to 
“reasonably consider a range of alternatives to meet the needs of SLD 
students before cutting available services”.35 Among the alternatives it 
failed to consider was cutting funding to the District School Board’s 
“Outdoor School”, which was a program available to all District students 
but “was not part of the core educational services”.36 
With respect to the Ministry, the Tribunal concluded that it had failed 
to provide adequate funding to the District School Board and had failed to 
monitor the Board’s decisions to ensure that the appropriate special edu-
cation programs were available to SLD students. Accordingly, it found 
that the Ministry was jointly and severally liable for the damages award. 
The Tribunal also ordered what it called “systemic remedies” against 
the Ministry. These remedies gave the Ministry one year to: 
a) make available funding for SLD students at actual incidence 
levels; 
b) establish mechanisms for determining that the support and 
accommodation services delivered to SLD students are appropriate 
and meet the stated goals of the School Act and the Special Needs 
Student Order; 
                                                                                                             
33 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 20. 
34 Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 931. The Board was permitted to run a deficit of 
$1.8 million in 1991/92 on the condition that it balance its budget by 1994. It began the 1994/95 
school year with a $1.12 million deficit, Moore SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 64–66. 
35 Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 938. 
36 Moore BCHRT, id. The Tribunal also concluded that the District School Board had failed 
to assess Jeffrey at an earlier stage, although this finding was quashed by the British Columbia 
Supreme Court and this part of the BCSC’s decision was not appealed and was therefore not before 
the SCC, Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 40. 
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c) ensure that all districts have in place early intervention programs 
so that SLD students can be identified early and appropriate 
intensive remediation services provided; and 
d) ensure that all school districts have in place a range of services to 
meet the needs of SLD students.37 
While it made these systemic orders, the Tribunal declined to “direct how 
the Ministry is to comply with the above orders”.38 
2. British Columbia Courts 
The British Columbia Supreme Court allowed the application for ju-
dicial review. The Court found that Jeffrey “should be compared to other 
special needs students, not to the general student population as the Tribu-
nal had done”.39 There was no evidence that Jeffrey had been 
discriminated against as compared to other students who required special 
education programs,40 and therefore the finding of differential treatment 
had not been established. A majority of the Court of Appeal confirmed 
the British Columbia Supreme Court’s ruling, agreeing that the appropri-
ate comparator group was other special needs students, not the general 
student population. In this regard, the Court of Appeal noted that “Jeffrey 
Moore received more special education services than any other student in 
his school”.41 Neither court found it necessary to consider the Tribunal’s 
remedial orders since they both rejected the finding of discrimination.  
                                                                                                             
37 Moore BCHRT, id., at para. 1015. 
38 Id., at para. 1016. 
39 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 23. See Moore SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 131, 139: 
“Did other special needs students receive supports or accommodations that Moore did not receive?” 
40 Moore SC, id., at para. 147:  
There is no basis upon which this Court could infer that other special needs students were 
provided with special education programs so unique to their needs that academic litera-
ture was scrutinized for options to promote individual potential and then those optimal 
new programs were implemented regardless of whether they had been integrated into 
teacher education or the general public education plan. 
41 Moore CA, supra, note 4, at para. 75. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) MOORE V. BRITISH COLUMBIA: A GOOD IDEA? 241 
 
3. Supreme Court of Canada 
(a) Substantive Analysis 
The Supreme Court described the “central issue” in this case as 
“what the relevant ‘service … customarily available to the public’ 
was”.42 While the Tribunal and the dissenting judge in the Court of Ap-
peal defined the service as “general” education, the reviewing judge and 
the Court of Appeal majority defined it as “special” education. Justice 
Abella agreed with the former, noting that “for students with learning 
disabilities … special education is not a service, it is the means by which 
those students get meaningful access to the general education services 
available to all British Columbia students”.43 While we are in agreement 
with this analysis, it is important to qualify this description of the service 
by noting that the service is not just a “general education”, but a general 
public school education, a factor which should be relevant at each stage 
of the equality and remedial analysis.  
While comparing the special education program that Jeffrey was get-
ting to the special education programs available to other students with 
disabilities may be a relevant consideration, we agree with the Supreme 
Court of Canada that it cannot be the primary basis of the comparison in 
this case. As Abella J. recognizes, limiting the analysis exclusively to this 
comparison would permit the District School Board to “cut all special 
needs programs and yet be immune from a claim of discrimination”.44 
The fact that a student or group of students has received the same or even 
more services than other students with disabilities does not tell us 
whether any of those students have been appropriately accommodated 
through an equitable allocation of the resources available to the board. 
Students who require more support should receive more accommodation 
than students who need less support, and the mere fact that a student gets 
more than others does not foreclose the inquiry into whether what that 
student has received is appropriate. On the other hand, there is always a 
concern that a Human Rights Tribunal (or a court) will focus exclusively 
                                                                                                             
42 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 27, quoting from s. 8 of the British Columbia Human 
Rights Code (see supra, note 32). 
43 Moore, SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 28. 
44 Id., at para. 30 (emphasis in original). 
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on the complainant before it,45 and assess the duty to accommodate with-
out regard to the competing needs of other disabled students who are not 
parties to the claim. All of these cases would be relatively simple if the 
school board had only one special education student to accommodate.  
Having determined that the service in question is general education, 
the Court held that the standard required by the Code was “[m]eaningful 
access to the educational opportunities offered by the Board”.46 In de-
scribing what this standard means in the context of special education, the 
Court referred to the familiar example of a ramp as a metaphor for all 
special education services. But the ramp analogy is of limited assistance 
in answering the difficult questions of what is required to achieve “mean-
ingful access” for students with learning disabilities and other disabilities 
that require accommodation to the educational program itself. A ramp 
simply removes a physical barrier to accessing the same school building, 
programs and services that other students use. It does not give better ac-
cess, or better or different programs and services to those who use it. It 
can be difficult to draw the line between what is an accommodation that 
must be given to provide “meaningful access” to a service available to 
all, and what is a special, different or enhanced service that government 
may choose to give in allocating resources among deserving groups. As 
the Court held in Eldridge, the right to “meaningful access” to medical 
and hospital services required the provision of sign-language interpreta-
tion, but not hearing aids, as that would be a discrete service or product 
that would go beyond ensuring access to the particular service at issue 
and instead “alleviate general disadvantage”.47  
The Court gave mixed signals about what the standard of “meaning-
ful access” requires in the context of special education. On the one hand, 
it stated that what is required is “adequate” special education, and that is 
not measured by the result that the student achieves, as a board may have 
                                                                                                             
45 Donna Greschner & Steven Lewis, “Auton and Evidence-Based Decision Making: 
Medicare and Courts” (2003) 82 Can. Bar Rev. 501, at 507-508: 
[G]overnment departments are better equipped than courts to manage complex programs 
and use resources effectively … Moreover , they have the major advantage of perspec-
tive: they not only can, but must consider the needs of all patients, compare the 
sometimes incommensurable and make often tragic trade-offs. In contrast, courts run a 
higher risk of telescopic vision: focussing on the case before them magnifies that case, 
and removes other needs and problems from their field of vision.  
46 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 4. 
47 Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
624, at paras. 78, 92 (S.C.C.). 
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done what was necessary to give access, “yet the hoped-for results did 
not follow”.48 Nor is it determined by whether broad, aspirational policy 
statements of governments or boards have been met; these “may not re-
flect realistic objectives” and therefore “a margin of deference is, as a 
result, owed to governments and administrators in implementing these 
broad, aspirational polices”.49  
On the other hand, the Court also referred to Tribunal findings that 
certain programs “would have benefitted” Jeffrey and were not available. 
The Court also appeared to support the view that the District School 
Board ought to have sacrificed the Outdoor School and retained the 
Diagnostic Centre, as “specialized and discretionary initiatives cannot be 
compared with the accommodations necessary in order to make the core 
curriculum accessible to severely learning disabled students”.50  
The Court did qualify this statement by indicating that the more 
significant flaw in the Board’s decision-making was that it undertook no 
assessment of what alternatives would be available if the Diagnostic 
Centre were to close.51 This aspect of the Court decision recognizes the 
reality that every transfer payment agency can legitimately make a claim 
to having a “funding shortfall”, but cannot use this as an excuse to 
allocate its available resources in a discriminatory way. The Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision indicates that, at the very least, this requires 
the District School Board to enter into a genuine process to properly 
consider the consequences of its allocation decision, and suggests that 
had the Board actually given proper consideration to these consequences 
and still come to the same conclusion, the result of the case may well 
have been different. In this regard, it is important to remember that the 
facts of this case arose in 1994-1995, and school boards and other public 
institutions have (we hope) come a long way since then in ensuring that 
their decision-making process takes into account their obligations to 
accommodate persons with disabilities. As a 2012 judicial review of a 
1994 school board decision, the Moore case may prove to be little more 
than an anachronism. 
If “meaningful access” required the provision of all special education 
programs or services that “would benefit” a student, it would not only 
                                                                                                             
48 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 35. 
49 Id. 
50 Id., at para. 51, quoting Rowles J.A. in Moore CA, supra, note 4, at para. 154. 
51 Id., at paras. 46 and 52. 
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impose unlimited and unrealizable requirements on Boards, but would 
also bear no relation to the public education service available in the pub-
lic system, which does not provide students with all programs that would 
benefit them. While we do not suggest that the Supreme Court has en-
dorsed this extreme view, if “meaningful access” means that all non-core 
programs must be eliminated before cuts are made to special education 
programs, this could severely impact a Board’s ability to allocate its 
funds among all programs. Given the undefined and potentially unlimited 
demand for special education services, this could have a significant effect 
on arts, music, physical education and other “non-core programs” that 
benefit all students of the Board. This extreme scenario illustrates the 
difficulties with this kind of discrimination standard, which would re-
quire human rights tribunals to delve deeply into education policy and 
funding allocation decisions and would require findings about the bene-
fits of so-called non-core, core and special education programs for all 
students, including students receiving special education services, as part 
of the general education program.  
In Moore, certain “bad facts” found by the Tribunal and relied on by 
the Supreme Court (these findings of fact were not the subject of the 
appeal to the Supreme Court) gave a strong evidentiary basis for the 
Court’s finding that the programs and services offered by the District 
School Board to Jeffrey after the closure of the Diagnostic Centre were 
“far from adequate”. Those findings, supported by the testimony of 
District School Board employees, were that Jeffrey required intensive 
remediation, that the services available through the District provided 
insufficient intensive remediation to meet his needs, and that such 
services were only available in private schools. The strong adverse factual 
findings about the insufficiency of the services available to Jeffrey, given 
his needs, grounded the Court’s conclusion that, in this case, Jeffrey had 
been denied meaningful access to general education available to other 
students. The Court has otherwise provided very little guidance on the 
very difficult and education policy-laden question of what will constitute 
“inadequate” special education that denies “meaningful access” to the 
publicly funded general education system. Parents and school boards may 
well disagree on what these inchoate standards require in individual cases. 
We hope that in interpreting and applying these standards in the future, 
the broader education policy issues that public schools face in delivering 
meaningful education to all students, including students with special 
education needs, will be given their proper consideration.  
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(b) Remedial Analysis 
(i) Damages 
The Supreme Court upheld the damages claim against the District 
School Board52 with virtually no analysis, stating simply that remedial 
decisions by the Tribunal are subject to a standard of patent unreason-
ableness, and that “this order ... is sustainable given the actual scope of 
the complaint”.53 There are, however, in our view, several serious con-
cerns with this damages award, both as a matter of principle and as an 
assessment of quantum.  
Our first concern is that the damages remedy transforms the Human 
Rights Code into a provincial equivalent of the United States IDEA stat-
ute by authorizing a Human Rights Tribunal to “require the district to 
reimburse the parents for the cost of the private education”.54 The deci-
sion whether to fund private schools or offer tuition vouchers to parents 
who opt out of the public school system is a policy choice for govern-
ments to make. As indicated above, all provinces in Canada have decided 
to dedicate all or the bulk of public education funding to the public 
school system as the best way to ensure that public schools have the re-
sources available to provide educational programs to all students, 
including students with special education needs. The damages remedy 
permits the Tribunal to circumvent the thrust of provincial education pol-
icy and creates a private school “voucher” that will siphon resources 
from the public school system. 
There is a second principled objection to remedying the public 
school system’s inadequate accommodation through private school tui-
tion reimbursement. Private schools may provide enhanced programs, 
services, ancillary benefits and facilities that are not available in any pub-
lic school, and that may not be “accommodation” for a student’s 
disability-based needs. As a result, the tuition charged to parents in pri-
vate schools may far exceed the per-student funding available to all other 
                                                                                                             
52 The amount of tuition to attend private school up to and including Grade 12, one-half the 
costs incurred for transportation to those schools and $10,000 for “the injury to dignity, feelings and 
self-respect”: Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 1022. 
53 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 55. For a discussion of the meaning of the phrase 
“patent unreasonableness”, see Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 
190 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunsmuir”], and discussion at note 93, infra. 
54 Burlington, supra, note 15, at 370; Forest Grove, supra, note 15, at 232. 
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students, with or without special needs, in public schools. Ordering pay-
ment of private school tuition imposes a standard of accommodation that 
bears no relationship with the education provided to students in the pub-
lic school system. Instead of reasonably accommodating a student’s 
needs within the multiple demands and fiscal and human resource limits 
and constraints of the public school system, a private school tuition pay-
ment voucher gives the student a different kind of education benefit that 
is not equivalent to what other public school students receive.  
Private schools are not subject to significant public oversight and do 
not have the same obligations as public schools to provide services to all 
students with all educational needs. Private schools may specialize in 
particular kinds of learning disabilities, and may reject students whose 
disabilities do not fit within their area of specialization or whose disabili-
ties are too serious to be accommodated by the private school.55 Public 
schools do not have this option. In addition, we now expect that most 
children with disabilities will be integrated within the regular class-
room,56 so that public school teachers may need to teach a broad range 
and ever-changing student population with a variety of disabilities.  
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that some parents may 
find a private school that, in their view, offers a better or more special-
ized program for their child. But this observation may be made about 
parents of all children, regardless of whether they have “special educa-
tion” needs. That is one reason many parents are prepared to spend in 
excess of $30,000 per year tuition for their child to attend the most ex-
pensive private schools. In contrast, the average funding provided in the 
Ontario public school system was approximately $11,209 per pupil in 
2012-2013.57 The fiscal reality is that some private schools will be able 
                                                                                                             
55 Hensel, supra, note 10. 
56 O. Reg. 181/98 (Identification and Placement of Exceptional Pupils), s. 17 provides:  
When making a placement decision … the [special education placement and review] 
committee shall, before considering the option of placement in a special education class, 
consider whether placement in a regular class, with appropriate special education ser-
vices, (a) would meet the pupil’s needs; and (b) is consistent with parental preferences.  
57 This average is based on adding the foundation grants (Primary (JK to Grade 3) 
$5,528.94, Junior and Intermediate (Grades 4 to 8) $4,602.92, Secondary (Grades 9 to 12) 
$5,747.53), which represented 46.4 per cent of school board funding, and all other capital and 
special-purpose grants. The special-purpose grants include grants specifically provided to 
supplement special education programs. It is important to remember that these “average” per-pupil 
grants are just that — averages — and do not reflect either the variability across the province of the 
funding flowing to school boards or the actual amount spent by boards on a per-student basis. School 
boards generally spend more than the average per-pupil amount on students receiving special 
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to outspend public schools on a per-pupil basis. Ordering public funding 
for a private school education that does not parallel the public system is 
not a reasonable accommodation to access the public system; it is instead 
an award of an entirely different educational benefit and may even be an 
entirely different type of service.  
These concerns are compounded by the Tribunal’s order that the 
tuition be paid not only for Grade 4 (the DC1 was only a two- to  
four-month program) but from Grades 4 to 12, a total of nine years. It is 
interesting to examine how the Tribunal arrived at this result. While the 
case was presented as a denial of access to the public education system, 
the only remedy ever sought by the complainants was payment of private 
school tuition. Jeffrey Moore left the public school system at the end of 
Grade 3 in 1995, but his Human Rights Code complaint against the 
District School Board was first filed in May 1997.58 By this time, 
accommodation of Jeffrey in the public school for Grade 4 was a moot 
point since he was already completing Grade 5 at the private school. The 
43 days of hearing before the Tribunal were drawn out over a number of 
years (2001, 2002 and 2005) and the reasons of the Tribunal were not 
handed down until December 21, 2005, by which time Jeffrey had 
already completed Grade 12. Clearly these kinds of protracted legal 
proceedings are wholly inadequate if the real goal is to find an 
appropriate accommodation for a disabled child within the public school 
system. The inference here is that the Human Rights Tribunal, which has 
no expertise regarding either education or special education, may not be 
the appropriate tribunal to be making these kinds of decisions. Instead, 
these proceedings should be brought before a specialized tribunal that 
can quickly assess parent complaints and order an appropriate placement 
for the student within the public school system. Such specialized 
processes do exist.59 For example, Ontario legislation provides for a  
                                                                                                             
education programs and services, with the actual amount spent reflecting the cost of programs and 
services for their individual needs. For a detailed explanation of Ontario’s funding model, see 
“Education Funding, Technical Paper, 2012-13, Ministry of Education”, <http://www.edu. 
gov.on.ca/eng/policyfunding/funding.html> [hereinafter “Education Funding Technical Paper”].  
58 The complaint was amended in August 1999 to add the Ministry of Education as a 
respondent (Moore SC, supra, note 4, at para. 3). 
59
 The process which existed in British Columbia in 1995 provided for an appeal to the 
School Board pursuant to s. 11 of the School Act, S.B.C. 1989, c. 61. This appeal process was 
replaced in 1996 by R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412, ss. 11-11.8, which established a formal process for 
appeal of certain s. 11 board decisions to a Superintendent of Achievement within the British 
Columbia Ministry of Education. If it had been determined that the pre-1996 appeal process was 
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two-stage appeal process that includes an informal appeal to a Special 
Education Appeal Board that can make recommendations to the school 
board, and a formal appeal to a Special Education Tribunal that involves 
a hearing under the Statutory Powers Procedures Act60 as prescribed by 
the Education Act.61 
The primary reason the hearing before the Tribunal took so long was 
because of the “systemic discrimination” complaints brought against the 
Ministry. The Supreme Court was critical of this aspect of the Tribunal 
hearing, stating that  
it was unnecessary for [the Tribunal] to hold an extensive inquiry into 
the precise format of the provincial funding mechanism or the entire 
provincial administration of special education in order to determine 
whether Jeffrey was discriminated against. The Tribunal, with great 
respect, is an adjudicator of the particular claim that is before it, not a 
Royal Commission.62 
By turning itself into a “Royal Commission” and allowing the hear-
ing to run for years, the Tribunal itself made it impossible to provide the 
only remedy that would achieve substantive equality: access to an appro-
priate program in the public school system that met the requirements of 
reasonable accommodation. Damages should not be provided in lieu of 
accommodation because of delays brought in commencing the claim or 
because the Tribunal took years to hear and decide the case. 
We recognize that an order requiring the school district to provide 
Jeffrey with better accommodation would have been of little practical 
benefit, as Jeffrey had already graduated from Grade 12 by the time the 
Tribunal issued its decision. The Supreme Court may well have been 
aware of this and tacitly applied the principle that “every right should have 
a remedy” when it upheld the Tribunal’s private school tuition award in 
this case. But if so, then it would have been preferable for the Court to 
clearly articulate this as the basis for its decision, and to indicate that this 
                                                                                                             
inadequate, there may have been some basis for proceeding before the Human Rights Tribunal 
instead. Neither the Tribunal nor the Supreme Court of Canada, however, gave any consideration to 
the adequacy of the appeal process in place in 1995.  
60 R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22. 
61 Ontario Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 57. The process is described in detail in Brenda 
Bowlby et al., An Educator’s Guide to Special Education Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 
2010), at c. 9 and c. 10. See also Eaton, supra, note 30. 
62 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 64. 
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was an extraordinary remedy made necessary as a result of the numerous 
and very lengthy delays in the proceedings before the Tribunal.  
Another concern is the Tribunal’s decision that once Jeffrey left the 
public school system in Grade 4 for the intensive remediation offered by 
the private school, there was no obligation for him to return to the public 
system after his learning skills improved. The Tribunal’s reasons for this 
were that the private school staff advised Jeffrey’s parents that Jeffrey was 
never ready to return to the public school system, and the Tribunal 
concluded that “[t]he Moores were entitled to accept this advice from 
professionals who had worked closely with Jeffrey, understood his needs, 
and whom they had come to trust”.63 According to the Tribunal, therefore, 
once a student is sent to private school, it is the staff of that school — who 
have a direct financial interest in the tuition paid to the private school — 
who decide whether and when a child is ready to return to the public 
school system. It would not be surprising if private school professionals 
are of the opinion that the program that they provide is superior to the 
program provided by the public school system and will recommend that 
the child remain with the private school. If they did not believe this they 
could hardly justify charging parents tuition.64  
Our point, however (and this brings us back to the substantive issue), 
is that whether the private school program is superior to the public school 
program is the wrong question for the Tribunal to ask. The question for 
the Tribunal is to determine the appropriate accommodation for Jeffrey, 
and to order that that accommodation be provided within the public 
school system. If the accommodation cannot be provided within the pub-
lic school system (for example, because of financial, human resource or 
other limitations), then it is not a reasonable accommodation. Where, 
as in Ontario, the public school system is statutorily required to pro-
vide education to all students, including students who require special 
education, accommodation in a private school is never a reasonable  
accommodation. 
There are additional reasons why ordering payment of private school 
tuition is, in our opinion, bad policy. First, the Tribunal tuition payment 
                                                                                                             
63 Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 976; see also para. 979: “Parents of a vulnerable 
special needs student are entitled to rely on the advice of the experts providing services.” 
64 One might also question the effectiveness of the private school’s intensive remediation 
program if its professionals were of the opinion that Jeffrey could never be reintegrated into the 
public school system, even with appropriate accommodation.  
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order presents the school board with a “zero-sum game”. No matter what 
accommodation the board is prepared to offer, if the accommodation is 
not 100 per cent of what the Tribunal holds (some years later) should 
have been provided, the school board becomes responsible for 100 per 
cent of the cost of private school tuition. The DC1 program was only of 
two to four months’ duration with a two-year follow-up. Nevertheless, 
because Jeffrey instead enrolled in private school and stayed in private 
school to Grade 12, the Board was ordered to pay the full tuition amount 
for all of those years. If the accommodation offered by the school board 
is less than adequate, the appropriate remedy is to require the school 
board to offer better accommodation, a remedy that may cost the board a 
fraction of the private school tuition.65 
Second, the Tribunal order establishes a financial incentive to both 
parents and school boards that may undermine their efforts to arrive at 
the appropriate accommodation for special-needs students. While ac-
commodation is generally accomplished successfully and with full 
cooperation between parents and school board professionals, there are 
certainly instances where parents and school board professionals disagree 
about the appropriate program or service.66 This is especially true in cir-
cumstances like the Moore case, where the Tribunal itself acknowledged 
that there was an “educational debate” and “no consensus among ex-
perts” on the best way to teach children with dyslexia.67 
The potential availability of reimbursement for full private school 
tuition could provide an economic incentive to those relatively affluent 
parents who can afford the initial financial outlay of tuition to transfer 
their child to the private school system and to decline offered programs or 
services from the public system that, in the parents’ view, fall short of 
what is available in the private school.68 If the parents are determined 
to send their child to the private school, there is an incentive to act 
                                                                                                             
65 Even the American IDEA legislation indicates that reimbursement of private school costs 
may be reduced in cases where a tribunal finds that the school district has provided a child with 
some special education services but concludes that these services are inadequate: Forest Grove, 
supra, note 15, at 242. 
66 Eaton, supra, note 30, at paras. 60, 77, 79. 
67 Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 1013 and Moore SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 12-13. 
68 Indeed, there is some evidence that this has been the effect of tuition payment orders 
under IDEA. See, e.g., Hensel, supra, note 10, at 345. 
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unilaterally and bring a Human Rights Code complaint to recoup the cost 
of private school tuition.69  
Conversely, school board officials could avoid their duty to accom-
modate students with disabilities by offering to pay private school tuition 
to a parent who, in the school board’s view, has unrealistic expectations 
of the public system. If we are serious about accommodating children 
with disabilities in the public system, then we should not permit public 
school boards to avoid this responsibility by paying to send children with 
disabilities to private schools. Indeed, in direct contrast to the United 
States IDEA legislation, Ontario legislation does not permit public school 
boards to pay private school tuition as a means of providing special edu-
cation programs. School boards must “provide or enter into an agreement 
with another board to provide … special education programs and special 
educations services for its exceptional pupils”.70 There is no authority to 
enter into such an agreement with a private school. 
The incentive to school boards to decline accommodation would be 
compounded if, as originally ordered by the Tribunal in this case, the 
Ministry of Education is also responsible for the payment of the private 
school tuition. To the extent that the tuition payments come directly from 
provincial budgets rather than the school board budget, school boards 
could actually save money by refusing to accommodate students with 
special needs within their schools.  
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the Tribunal had gone 
too far in ordering the Ministry liable for any damages. While the Court 
recognized that the “District’s budgetary crisis was created, at least in part, 
by the Province’s funding shortfalls”,71 this did not negate the fact that it is 
the District School Board that has the ultimate responsibility for allocating 
whatever resources it has in a non-discriminatory fashion: “it was the 
                                                                                                             
69 If you think that private school vouchers are a good public policy (and many people do), 
this would not be the best way to implement such a policy because it makes the voucher available 
only to those parents who can afford to pay the private tuition upfront and hope to be reimbursed. 
Less affluent parents who cannot afford the initial outlay of tuition will have no choice but to remain 
in the public system. If private school vouchers are to be made available, they should be available to 
all parents without regard to their ability to pay private tuition in advance of a hoped-for damages 
award.  
70 Ontario Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 170(1)7 (emphasis added). The Quebec 
Education Act, supra, note 21, s. 213 does authorize school boards to make agreements with 
privately funded schools for the provision of instructional services and/or for “the provision of 
student services and special educational services, literacy services or popular education services”. 
71 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 54. 
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District which failed to properly consider the consequences of closing the  
Diagnostic Centre or how to accommodate the affected students”.72 
(ii) Systemic Remedies 
This then brings us to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
to reverse the two “systemic” remedies ordered by the Tribunal against 
the Ministry. The funding mechanism employed by the province — 
“block funding” versus “incidence funding” — was a central issue at the 
Tribunal and resulted in one of the Tribunal’s systemic orders against the 
province. The Supreme Court rejected the Tribunal’s order that the Min-
istry “make available funding for SLD students at actual incidence 
levels” on the basis that the connection between the province’s funding 
mechanism and the closure of the Diagnostic Centre “is remote, given 
the range of factors that led to the District’s budgetary crisis”.73 As ex-
plained below, any funding mechanism can result in higher or lower 
funding depending on the level of funding and a host of other variables 
that must be taken into account. The Court also recognized the province’s 
interest in establishing a funding mechanism that will “ensure that dis-
tricts do not have an incentive to over-report Severe Learning Disabilities 
students, so long as it also complies with its human rights obligations”.74 
This point merits further discussion because it has wider implications 
for a variety of large government programs. While education funding is a 
highly complex policy area with multiple funding mechanisms at play, 
the following simplified explanation may be helpful to understand this 
issue. “Incidence funding” requires the school board to identify and re-
port the actual number of students with severe learning disabilities 
(“SLD”) within the board, and funding by the province is based on the 
number of SLD students reported by each board multiplied by a per-
student grant. 
The per-student grant generated by incidence funding is not “custom-
ized” to the needs of a specific student, but is a fixed per-student amount 
set by the province. Accordingly, the total funding received by the school 
board will depend upon the grant amount set by the province: higher per-
pupil grants will result in more funding, while lower per-pupil grants will 
                                                                                                             
72 Id. 
73 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 65. 
74 Id. 
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result in less.75 While special education grants must be spent on special 
education, the grants generated are not earmarked for any particular stu-
dent, and the District School Board is responsible for allocating whatever 
revenue is generated by these grants among all of the special education 
students in the District.  
The difficulty with incidence funding was that it required the school 
board to provide the province with a claim for every SLD student to 
qualify for supplemental funding, and these reports consumed profes-
sional resources that could have been better spent providing services to 
the student. In addition, it was difficult for the Ministry to come up with 
a clear, concise definition of eligibility for SLD funding, which made it 
difficult for the Ministry to verify the funding claims made by the Dis-
trict Board.76 Definitions could not be as simple as a diagnosis, because 
many learning disabilities, including dyslexia, are of varying severity; 
some students with dyslexia will have a mild learning disability, while 
others with the same diagnosis will have a severe learning disability, a 
distinction that may not be apparent until a child matures.77 This defini-
tion/verification issue became a concern as the number of SLD students 
being reported by some school boards began to escalate rapidly. Finally, 
there was evidence that the incidence of SLD students was fairly uniform 
across the province,78 so it made more sense to dispense with the costs 
(both financial and time) of providing and verifying the claims, and just 
provide all boards with stable funding based on the uniform incidence of 
SLD students. This is referred to as “block funding”. Like incidence 
funding, the amount of revenue generated by block funding depends 
primarily on the grant rate set by the province. It also depends on the uni-
form incidence level chosen by the province. The uniform incidence 
level depends in turn on how SLD students are defined.79 There is noth-
ing inherent in either funding mechanism to ensure any particular level 
                                                                                                             
75 Prior to the establishment of provincial grant based funding formulas, most school boards 
were funded primarily from local property taxes, and revenue was tied to assessment wealth; 
assessment-rich school boards were able to spend considerably more money per student than 
assessment-poor school boards at the same or lower tax effort. The ability to fund different levels of 
spending was not related to student need, see OECTA v. Ontario, [2001] S.C.J. No. 14, [2001] 
1 S.C.R. 470 (S.C.C.) [“OECTA”]. 
76 Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at paras. 199, 218-219.  
77 Id., at para. 10 and Moore SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 7, 10-13, 20, 27. 
78 Moore SC, id., at paras. 54-55. 
79 Assuming that an objective definition could be found, the “actual” incidence level would 
also depend upon how “SLD” is defined by the province. 
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of funding, nor does one mechanism guarantee a higher level of funding 
than another. 
This account is a simplified explanation of two funding mechanisms, 
and the funding mechanism actually employed by the British Columbia 
government had certain features of both. The specific details of these 
mechanisms cover many pages of complex regulations. Details aside, 
there are three points to remember, whichever funding mechanism is 
used: (1) school boards have finite budgets that are established by the 
province, which sets the grant rate; (2) it is the responsibility of the 
school board to figure out how to allocate this finite budget that it re-
ceives from the province; and (3) the school board will not have enough 
money to provide all the educational programs and services that parents 
want or education experts recommend.80 
Education funding is a multibillion-dollar endeavour. In 2012-2013, 
for example, funding to school boards in Ontario through the provincial 
grant formula amounted to nearly $21 billion.81 Of this amount, over 
$2.5 billion was earmarked specifically for special education programs 
and services.82 Over 300,000 students (out of a total of 1.8 million) in 
Ontario’s publicly funded system receive special education programs and 
services. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently held that equal-
ity in the design of such broadly based government programs does not 
require perfect correspondence.83 It is unrealistic to demand that any 
province accurately calculate the “actual incidence” and individual needs 
of these hundreds of thousands of students and base its allocation of bil-
lions of dollars in special education funds to school boards on such 
individualized assessments.  
                                                                                                             
80 District School Boards are not permitted to run deficit budgets without provincial 
approval: B.C. School Act, supra, note 21, s. 127(2). The same requirement applies in Ontario: see 
Ontario Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 232(3), (4). See also Ward v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
[2003] O.J. No. 935, 104 C.R.R. (2d) 189 (Ont. S.C.J.), in which public school trustees brought an 
unsuccessful Charter challenge to these provisions. 
81 Education Funding Technical Paper, supra, note 57, at 13. 
82 Id., at 29. Since most special education students are integrated within the regular 
classroom, they are also the beneficiaries of the grant money that funds all other educational 
programs such as classroom teachers, education assistants, textbooks and learning materials, 
classroom supplies, etc. While special education grants can be used only for special education 
programs and services, special education students (in both integrated and congregated placements) 
do access programs and services available to all other students. 
83 Martin v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 
2 S.C.R. 504, at para. 82 (S.C.C.); Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, 
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 55 (S.C.C.). 
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While a recital of the recent history and details of Ontario’s funding 
formula is beyond the scope of this paper, Ontario’s experience with 
allocating special-education funding to school boards based on individual 
actual incidence claims by school boards was very similar to that in 
British Columbia. Following the introduction of the new education grant 
formula in 1998, Ontario tried to establish a process that would enable it 
to fund severe learning disabilities on an actual incidence basis. In order 
to provide funding on an “actual incidence level”, the provincial 
government had to establish a process for validating or verifying school 
board claims, as the fairness of the allocation depends on the application 
of criteria, the accuracy of claims and the capacity of boards to submit 
claims for all potential claimants. Ontario’s validation process evolved 
over several years,84 but was criticized by school board officials and 
professional educators because it diverted human and financial resources 
from providing programs and services to students, and because consistent, 
objective verification of actual incidence levels across boards proved 
elusive. Based on this experience, Ontario largely abandoned the claims-
based process in 200585 and has moved toward a system of proxy or 
“block” funding that better ensures that the needed grants are provided in 
a timely and efficient manner and that available funds go to programs and 
services rather than administration. 
The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal had also concluded 
that the Ministry’s responsibilities extended to ensuring the appropriate-
ness of special education programs and services at the individual level, 
holding that the Ministry “failed to ensure that Jeffrey’s needs were ap-
propriately accommodated in the District” and that the Ministry “does 
not audit to ensure that districts’ special programs meet the needs of in-
dividual students or groups of students”.86 Based on this finding, the 
Tribunal ordered the government to “establish mechanisms for determin-
ing that the support and accommodation services delivered to SLD 
students are appropriate” and to “ensure that all school districts have in 
                                                                                                             
84 Student Focused Funding – Legislative Grants for the School Board 1998-1999 Fiscal 
Year, O. Reg. 287/98 [revoked]; Student Focused Funding – Legislative Grants for the School Board 
2003-2004 Fiscal Year, O. Reg. 139/03 [revoked]. 
85 Grants for Student Needs – Legislative Grants for the 2004-2005 School Board Fiscal 
Year, O. Reg. 145/04 [revoked]; Grants for Student Needs – Legislative Grants for the 2005-2006 
School Board Fiscal Year, O. Reg. 400/05; Grants for Student Needs – Legislative Grants for the 
2006-2007 School Board Fiscal Year, O. Reg. 341/06 [revoked]. 
86 Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at paras. 827, 880. 
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place a range of services to meet the needs of SLD students”.87 This or-
der would have centralized the structure for the delivery of special 
education by requiring the Ministry to assume a direct role in the design, 
delivery, oversight and audit of individual special education programs 
and services, a role that is now undertaken by local school boards.88 
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed this ruling without any 
comment or analysis beyond its brief explanation as to why systemic or-
ders were not an appropriate remedy in this case.89 This particular 
remedy, however, merits more analysis because it demonstrates one of 
the dangers of giving administrative tribunals the jurisdiction to order 
broad systemic remedies that can fundamentally reshape important social 
programs subject to judicial review only on the basis of reasonableness.  
As a general policy, every province in Canada has determined that 
special education is most appropriately delivered and monitored at the 
local level by the school board.90 This decentralized structure reflects the 
consensus view that the needs of individual students are best addressed at 
the local level, where school board staff of professional educators and 
consultants who are most familiar with a student’s individual strengths 
and needs can make decisions about appropriate special education ser-
vices for that student. It also recognizes that school boards have 
experience and expertise in designing and delivering special education 
programs. 
The decentralized structure for the delivery of special education also 
allows school boards to develop special education placement options, 
programs and services in a manner that reflects local needs, resources 
and circumstances. In Ontario,91 school boards have different approaches 
to placement options and offer different programs and services based on 
various local and board-specific factors. For example, where a congre-
gated class is the appropriate or preferable placement, it may be easier 
                                                                                                             
87 Id., at paras. 827, 880, 1015. 
88 We would argue that the Ministry had already established “a mechanism for determining 
that the support and accommodation services delivered to SLD students are appropriate” by 
establishing local school boards staffed by professional educators to make these decisions at the 
local level — but this is exactly the mechanism that the Tribunal found to be a source of systemic 
discrimination. 
89 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 64-66. 
90 See provincial legislation, supra, note 21. 
91 As indicated above, there are over 300,000 students across 72 school boards receiving 
special education services and programs in Ontario’s public school system. 
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for school boards in urban areas to congregate students in self-contained 
classes than it is for school boards in rural northern areas where two or 
more students with a particular type of exceptionality and similar needs 
may live a considerable distance away from one another. School boards 
may also have differing philosophies when it comes to placement options 
for exceptional students. 
There is a considerable risk that shifting responsibility to the Minis-
try for the oversight and evaluation of all individual special education 
programs would lead to an ineffective and unworkable structure overseen 
by officials who are not in a position to know a student’s individual 
needs or strengths, or the resources that may be available to any particu-
lar board given the wide variety of circumstances across the province. 
Yet the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal seems to have per-
ceived greater centralization of special education as a panacea, even 
though it referred to no evidence and offered no reasoned analysis as to 
how the shift in responsibility from the school board to the Ministry 
would eliminate the discrimination it identified. The Tribunal, which ac-
knowledged itself as having “no inherent expertise in the appropriate 
pedagogical approach to remediating SLDs”,92 imposed a systemic rem-
edy without any evidence to support, or any consideration of, the efficacy 
or utility of such a systemic change.  
The Supreme Court of Canada held that this remedy did not even 
meet the reasonableness standard to which the remedial decisions of the 
Tribunal were subject.93 While we agree with that assessment, we note 
that challenging a tribunal decision on the basis that it is unreasonable is 
a notoriously difficult standard to meet. While reasonableness may be the 
appropriate standard in cases where a tribunal acts within its area of pri-
mary expertise and imposes a remedy that has little or no impact beyond 
an individual employer, landlord or service provider, it is not appropriate 
in cases where a tribunal imposes a broad systemic remedy that requires 
                                                                                                             
92 Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 1014. 
93 Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 55, 57. The standard of review for remedial 
decisions of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal is “patently unreasonable”. See 
Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45, s. 59. “Patently unreasonable” has been assimilated 
or “collapsed” into the single standard of reasonableness (see Dunsmuir, supra, note 53, at paras. 44, 
45). Section 45.8 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 also establishes “patent 
unreasonableness” as the standard of review for Human Rights Tribunal decisions: “[A] decision of 
the Tribunal is final and not subject to appeal and shall not be altered or set aside in an application 
for judicial review or in any other proceeding unless the decision is patently unreasonable.” 
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vague but fundamental changes to the delivery of public programs and 
services and that will have a broad impact beyond the parties to the par-
ticular proceeding. In such cases tribunals should be held to a standard of 
correctness, just as courts are when they impose similar remedies under 
the Charter. The degree to which public school governance should be 
centralized or decentralized has been a perennially controversial issue.94 
The Moore case demonstrates the potential danger of permitting such 
issues to be determined by a single Human Rights Tribunal chair in a 
single case, so long as she is not acting unreasonably. The public policy 
stakes are just too high, and this sort of systemic remedy, if it is within 
the jurisdiction of a Human Rights Tribunal at all, should be reviewable 
on a correctness standard.95 
IV. CONCLUSION 
All parents want the best possible education for their children. The 
unavoidable reality of the public school system, however, is that, what-
ever its many strengths, school boards have the unenviable task of 
allocating their limited budget in a world of unlimited demand. That is 
why the substantive and remedial analyses in cases like Moore are inex-
tricably intertwined. If, on the one hand, the goal of special education 
programs is to provide children with disabilities access to the public 
school system, then the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Moore 
does little to advance that cause. Neither the Court’s substantive analysis 
of “meaningful access” nor its approval of the reimbursement of 
nine years of private school tuition provides guidance to tribunals tasked 
with determining how a child with disabilities might be accommodated 
within the public school in future cases where parents and the school 
board disagree. If, on the other hand, our society believes that a private 
school voucher is an appropriate alternative to accommodation within the 
public school system, provincial governments should be encouraged to 
                                                                                                             
94 See OECTA, supra, note 75; Public School Boards Assn. v. Alberta, [2000] S.C.J. No. 45, 
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 409 (S.C.C.); Ontario Public School Boards Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
[1997] O.J. No. 3184, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 346 (Ont. Gen. Div.). All of these cases were unsuccessful 
challenges to government measures providing for greater centralization of education governance and 
funding. 
95 We recognize that such a change may require statutory amendment in jurisdictions like 
Ontario and British Columbia where the statute itself provides for judicial review on the basis of 
reasonableness. 
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enact American-style voucher legislation to offer parents this alternative 
without the need for costly and time-consuming litigation. In our view, 
these two visions of education are not compatible, and if we choose the 
latter route we must accept the impact that the resulting diminished re-
sources will have on the capacity of public schools to accommodate 
those students with disabilities remaining in the public system. We must 
also accept the loss of inclusiveness and diversity in the public system 
that would result from the withdrawal of students with disabilities from 
public schools. The preferable route is to require that disagreements 
about special education programs be dealt with expeditiously and by spe-
cialized tribunals with sufficient expertise to realistically distinguish 
between access by a single student to the best possible education that 
money can buy, and access to a general public school education that must 
serve and accommodate all students.  

